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Nunca Mas: Truth Commissions, Prevention,
and Human Rights Culture
Margaret Urban Walker

Truth commissions have become a common measure, and one increasingly
expected, in the wake of authoritarian repression or domestic political conflict. The core functions of truth commissions, from which they derive their
name, are discovering, disseminating, and preserving a truthful record of
events, causes, patterns, and individual and institutional responsibilities surrounding specified human rights violations during a particular period of time .1
Around these core functions , however, a corona of high hopes and ambitious
expectations has emerged. Prominent among these is a widespread conviction
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See Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge ofTruth
Commissions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011); Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and
Procedural Fairness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2oo6); Tristan Anne Borer,
Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2oo6); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: O xford
University Press, 2ooo); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History
after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); Henry J. Steiner, Truth
Commissions: A Comparative Assessment (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1997). A
state-of-the-practice model is found in United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights,
Rule-ofLaw Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions (New York: United Nations,
2oo6),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawTruthCommissionsen.pdf
(accessed 9 March 2012).
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that telling the truth about past abuses leads or contributes to preventing similar abuses from occurring again. Truth commission mandates and reports
universally insist that revealing the truth of an era of repression or violence
will contribute to the prevention of similar abuses in the future. 2 The same
claim echoes throughout the surrounding literature on truth commissions.
This hopeful conviction is not confined to formal truth commission practice
but extends to the activity of truth recovery and dissemination in varied forms.
The introduction to one book on alternative modes of truth telling- including artwork, gossip, music, and humor - says: "The words 'nunca mas,' never
again, used throughout Latin America and elsewhere express a simple ambition: to use truth and memory about the violent and authoritarian past to
prevent its return."3 It is not at all clear, however, how the process and output
of a truth commission in particular can contribute directly to prevention of
human rights abuses. Enthusiasm for truth commissions is increasingly being
met with skepticism, including skepticism about the impact of such commissions in preventing future violence, repression , and abuse.4 Svetan Todorov
• The Report of Chile's National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, as one example,
claims that establishing an "impartial, complete, and objective" truth can "in itself serve the
intended purpose of prevention." The Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth
and Reconciliation, 885, http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-chile-90 (accessed
20 August 2011). In the literature, see Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd,
"Constructing a Report: Writing Up the 'Truth,"' 288; Rajeev Bargava, "Restoring Decency to
Barbaric Societies," 54; and Elizabeth Kiss, "Moral Ambition," 72, all in Robert I. Rotberg and
Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality ofTruth Commissions (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2ooo). This is but a tiny sample of such claims.
3 Ksenija Bilbija, et al., "Introduction," in Ksenija Bilbija, Jo Ellen Fair, Cynthia E. Milton, and
Leigh A. Payne, eds., The Art ofTruth-telling about Authoritarian Rule (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press. 2005), 4·
4
Other trends in truth commission skepticism involve supposed therapeutic effects of testifying,
weakness in truth commission methodologies, and proceedings that create silences as well
as truths. On therapeutic claims, see Davi d Mendeloff, "Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing
the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice," Human Rights Quarterly
31 (2009): 592-623; David Mendeloff, "Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict
Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?" International Studies Review 6 (2004): 355-380;
Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 145-162; and Brandon Hamber, Transforming Societies
after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and Mental Health (Dordrecht: Springer,
2009), 53-73. On supposed methodological infirmity, see Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick
Ball, "The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Mrica, and
Guatemala," Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 1-43, and Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick
Ball, "Levels of Truth: Macro-Truth and the TRC," in Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van der
Merwe, eds., Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2oo8 ). On partial truths and silences, see Erin Daly, "Truth
Skepticism: An Enquiry into the Value ofTruth in Times of Transition," International Journal
of Transitional Justice 2 (2oo8): 23-41; Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, "The Irreconcilable Goals
of Transitional Justice," Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2oo8): 95-u8; Laurel E. Fletcher and
Harvey M. Weinstein, with Jamie Rowen, "Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional
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has recently written of the Sterility of calls to remember" in the face of continuing atrocities and genocides.s Questions about whether and how truth
commissions contribute to future peace sharpen as truth req)Very begins to be
seen as a possible feature of post-conflict justice generally.
Truth commissions (and the practical and scholarly literature surrounding
them) developed as a response to post-authoritarian settings. Truth commissions assumed a prominent place among a set of measures aimed at establishing
the rule of law, respect for rights, and civic and social trust after severe abuses
of state power and domestic violence. Along with criminal prosecutions, vetting, reparations, and institutional reforms, truth commissions emerged as one
aspect of"transitional justice"; for many, truth commissions are emblematic of
transitions from state repression and domestic rights abuses to democracy. Yet
all of these "transitional" measures are being "progressively transferred from
their tplace of origin' in post-authoritarian setting, to post-conflict contexts and
even to settings in which conflict is ongoing or to those in which there has
been no transition to speak of," in the words of Pablo de Greiff, special rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of nonrecurrence, in his first report to the United Nations Human Rights Council. 6
Transitional measures are thus increasingly being seen more broadly as parts
of post-conflict justice.
At the same time, there is new and rapid expansion of the centuries-old
tradition of ujust war theory" to encompass not only moral principles for just
conduct in resorting to war (jus ad bellum) and moral principles for just conduct in making war (jus in bello) but also the less-developed area of moral
principles for just conduct in the termination of and sequel to war (jus post
bellum). There is some considerable convergence, and increasing pressure
toward convergence, between the demands of transitional and post-conflict
justice. Norms of individual criminal responsibility, compensation and
reparations, and institutional reform and rehabilitation play roles in both
approaches. Truth-telling, however, is one core transitional measure that has
Justice: A Historical Perspective," Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 163-220; Kimberly
Theidon, "Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women, and War," Journal of Human
Rights 6 (2007): 453-478; and Tim Kelsall, "Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone," Human Rights Quart-erly 27 (2005):
36 1-391.
s Svetan Todorov, "Memory as Remedy for Evil," Journal of International Criminal Justice 7
(2009): 447-462, 449·
6 United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Grieff," United
Nations Document NHRC/21/46, August 9, 2012. De Greiff urges caution and close attention
to specific context in applying these measures to very different situations.
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not usually been transposed into the broader post-conflict context. 7 Recent
thinking on jus post bellum affirms the establishment of a peaceful and just
community as the guiding ideal of post-war practice. 8 Thus, from the standpoint of principles of jus post bellum, it becomes significant to make a case
that a truth recovery process, of which a truth commission is the clearest institutional example, can be seen as contributing to the establishment and stability of a just peace. A just peace encompasses both the cessation of hostilities
through a just termination of conflict, and the creation of societal conditions
for the future enjoyment of human rights. The role of truth commissions in
prevention of future abuses, then, matters both for its role in transitions to a
rights-respecting democratic order and for securing the conditions of a just
and lasting peace.
Truth commissions, at least in their domestic uses, can obviously contribute to future prevention of violence and abuse instrumentally, through
implementation of the recommendations that truth commissions are invariably tasked to make in their reports. A truth commission's recommendations
can have a particular salience and persuasiveness when supported directly on
the basis of its documentation of abuses of power, failures of leadership, and
ineffective or malignant institutions. A truth commission has the potential
to seize the transitional moment to command attention and to utilize public
interest in the commission's findings to make the case for societal change and
institutional reform. This potential instrumental contribution to prevention,
however, depends upon the implementation of the measures a truth commission recommends. Truth commissions are, in and of themselves, powerless to
implement what they recommend or to ensure that their recommendations
are carried out.
My focus here is instead on a more direct, if partial and dependent, way
a truth commission itself might contribute to prevention through what it is
and does, and not only through what it recommends. This direct contribution might be especially relevant in generalizing the role of truth recovery to
a wider post-conflict context, where the aims might be expected to go beyond
domestic reforms, but it applies at least as well to the common domestic focus

7
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One exception is Mark Freeman and Drazan Ojukic, "Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice,"
in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner, eels., Jus Post Bellum: Toward a Law ofTran sition from
Conflict to Peace (The Hague: T. M. C . Asser Press, 2oo8).
See Brian Orend, The Morality ofWar (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2oo6); Larry May, After War
Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Larry
May and Andrew T. Forcehimes, eels., Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law (New
York: C ambridge University Press, 2012). May, in After War Ends (2-6), explores the complexities surrounding the "post" in post-conflict justice, as mentioned by de Greiff.
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of truth commissions.9 I do not offer a general account of truth commissions
and their varied aims. Instead, I focus only on the preventive aspiration of
truth commissions and offer a particular argument that supports a modest
version of the claim that truth commissions contribute to the prevention of
future human rights abuses. I will defend the idea that truth commissions, by
the nature of their processes and products, contribute in specific ways to the
prevention of future violations by promoting a culture of human rights, both
in their individual operation and as a part of an international trend.
My claim is that truth commissions are one concerted and powerful pedagogical practice of a human rights culture. They express, enact, and demonstrate that culture in order to promote it in a fairly direct way: by teaching and
. interpreting human rights language, explaining and publicizing human rights
standards, and cultivating awareness of the reality, danger, and avoidability
of human rights violations, with the intent to influence understanding and
behavior. In Part I, I argue that what truth commissions characteristically do
or can do in their own proceedings contributes to entrenching the language
and evaluative scheme of human rights, altering perceptions of the past and
creating motivation for avoiding and confronting human rights violations in
the future. In Part II, I consider the relevance to my view of some of the growing mass of recent empirical research that puts claims about truth commission
effects to the test of qualitative and quantitative analysis.
10

9.1. PROMOTING A CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

In this section, I explore the way in which the characteristic processes and
products of truth commissions inherently embody and demonstrate, ·for
local and global audiences, the language and values of a culture of human
rights. The idea of "human rights culture" is used very widely, and, it seems,

9
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See Margaret Urban Walker, "Post-conflict Truth Telling: Exploring Extended Territory," in
Larry May and Andrew T. Forcehimes, eds., Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), on the rationale and limits of truth-telling
beyond the domestic context.
On South Africa, see James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided
Nation? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), and Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van
der Merwe, eds. , Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC De/iver?(Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2oo8). See also Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions
and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (New York:
Routledge, 2010); Tricia D . Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice
in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington, D. C. : United States
Institutes of Peace Press, 2010); and Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights
Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
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without explanation or precise definition. Much as Elise Boulding speaks of
"cultures -those complexes of historical identity, values, know-how, and ways
of behaving," I will use here a broad and simple idea of "culture" that involves
sharing mutually intelligible language, values, and interpretations and norms
of behavior, with implications for how we act and how we understand and
judge ourselves and others. 11 A culture of human rights would be an environment in which people are articulate in the language and requirements of
human rights as a moral framework. So promoting a culture of human rights
requires teaching a shared language of human rights that affirms certain values.and that fosters broad areas of agreement on the interpretation and acceptability of certain kinds of behavior. A culture of human rights would cultivate
alertness to the possibility and prevalence of rights abuses, priming people to
recognize violations and overcoming tendencies to denial and disbelief. A culture of human rights would also be one that disposes individuals to see certain
possibilities of action (personally and collectively) as required and prohibited;
to be moved in judgment and feeling to do and support what is required; and
to refrain from and condemn what is prohibited.
I believe then that four features are plausibly associated with a culture of
human rights: a distinct evaluative language and standards; epistemic priming
to recognize and acknowledge abuses; inhibition and deterrence of behavior
that violates standards; and preparation to act, with protest, resistance, and
intervention, in the face of immanent or manifest violations. I do not argue
but rather assume that these features are features of a human rights culture.
My argument takes this form: if these are features of a moral and political
environment we could call a culture of human rights, then there are correspondingly specific ways that a truth commission's process, findings, and
recommendations can express and promote a culture of human rights.
9.1.1. Articulating Human Rights Language and Exemplifying

Standards
First, a culture of human rights is one in which the language of human rights
is familiar and is used to identify minimally acceptable and grossly unacceptable conduct in terms of human rights standards and human rights abuses.
" Elise Boulding, Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2ooo), 84. My view is compatible with the understanding that transnational human
rights culture stands in complex relation to local culhues and situations with which it engages.
Sally Engle Merry sees human rights as a cultural practice, "producing new cultural understandings and actions" (228-229) that require investigation. See her Human Rights and Gender
Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago,
2oo6) on this process with respect to violence against women as a human rights issue.
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Forms of violence against human beings are labeled in terms of unambiguous criminal categories, such as torture, illegal detention, sexual slavery, or
genocide. The correct application of human rights language involves understanding that certain acts or policies are clearly and categorically wrong independent of the political context in which they occur and the social or political
standing of those to whom or by whom they are done. A truth commission in
its very proceedings articulates and animates the language of human rights,
demonstrating its meaning in application, conveying the categorical nature
and the human importance of its requirements, and in the process framing
and interpreting past and future actions in human rights terms.
A human rights culture prepares people to speak and correctly apply the language of human rights both prospectively and retrospectively to their own and
others' actions, as well as to actions and policies of governments, institutions,
and political groups. Prospectively, individuals understand when certain acts
are framed in human rights categories that these acts are categorically prohibited as individual behavior and as public policy. In targeting acts for investigation under the category of human rights violations and rendering judgments
that acts already committed are correctly labeled as such, truth commissions
also perform a sort of translation into the past with implications for the future.
A truth commission's conclusions resolve unclarity or ambiguity in retrospect
about the unacceptable and criminally punishable nature of certain actions
in the past. Truth commissions consistently redescribe past actions and policies within their mandates in the language of human rights abuses. Evasive or
defensive labeling of actions and policies, misleading euphemisms, or justifying discourses about public order and political necessity are replaced by the
clear vocabulary of actions categorically prohibited under human rights and
humanitarian standards. Even when individual actions are done in the service
of country or honorable values, or done out of solidarity, conformity, or obedience, those actions are pointedly redescribed in the language of gross abuses
and so reframed as the crimes of disappearance, torture, illegal detention, kidnapping, extrajudicial execution, sexual slavery, systematic sexual violence, or
genocide.
This powerful reframing function of truth commissions can only be fully
effective, however, when a truth commission is committed to investigating
offenses on all sides of a conflict or political struggle, for this underscores
the categorical unacceptability of certain kinds of actions regardless of particular actors, victims, motives, or circumstances. Equally important, a truth
commission should avoid moral equivalence by attending to differences in
severity, extent, and systematic character among the violations it investigates,
according these violations due and proportionate weight and censure. When a
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truth commission examines all actors and offenses, and properly discriminates
among them in kind, extent, and severity, a truth commission models the
underlying principle of just discrimination among individuals (and groups)
who bear different amounts or kinds of responsibility or who are responsible for different kinds of offenses. In this way, a truth commission models a
principle of fairness (and in its formal version, of the rule of law) that is also a
part of a culture of human rights. Judgments of wrongful conduct should be
congruent with the standards that define acceptable conduct, regardless of the
actors to whom the standards are applied; judgments of wrong and responsibility should be consistent across like cases, and should discriminate among
unlike cases.
Truth commissions operate in the wake of circumstances in which the rule
of law has broken down or in which the appearance of law has been preserved while nonarbitrary or impartial applications of law (or of the restraints
imposed by law) have been abandoned in favor of political opportunity or
expediency. A truth commission's even-handed investigation of human rights
abuses can reassert the value of equality under laws and fundamental norms,
including equality of worth of victims of violations, equality of accountability
of those perpetrating abuses, and equal protection of citizens. The nature of
the continuing controversy over whether truth commissions should publicly
identify perpetrators who are known so that they are made accountable, or
should refrain from public identification in the absence of proof under the
more rigorous conditions of a criminal proceeding, reflects an understanding
that while a truth commission is not a judicial proceeding, expectations of fair
consideration and equal protection (of both victims and perpetrators) bear on
the legitimacy of a truth commission 's judgmentS. 12
The use of public hearings of victims' testimonies, now common procedure
for truth commissions after South Mrica's striking precedent, allows truth commissions to translate the legalistic terminology of human rights violations into
vivid terms of human pain, anguish, and irreparable loss. Abstract categories
are interpreted through powerful and disturbing personal narratives that make
the human and social costs of violence and repression concrete. The pictures
truth commissions present of individual suffering of victims and families , of
widespread terror and complicity, of failure or corruption of central institutions, and of massive numbers of victims of heinous crimes, demonstrate

12

See Priscilla Hayner's chapter, "Naming Na mes of Perpetrators" in Unspeakable Truths,
2nd ed .. See also Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Pablo de Greiff, "Truth Telling and the Rule of Law"
for discussion of the importance of the rule of law in political reconciliation.
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conclusively not only what human rights abuses are, but why human rights
matter. When victims testify in detail to having been tortured or raped, or
about their fruitless searches for spouses and children disappeared, including
details about the actions and demeanor of those who carried out these acts,
or the scorn of officials who ignored, taunted, or insulted them, it becomes
more difficult to retreat to euphemism or justification. The contribution of
truth commissions to investing the discourse of human rights with meaning is
direct and often dramatic. 13
The potential power of the voice of the actual victim to cut through various kinds of dodges, excuses, justifications, and denials with a concrete
first-person story of shocking violence, cruelty, or indignity has made South
Mrica's innovative public victim testimonies a current standard for other commissions. However, recruiting victims' testimonies to the project of human
rights pedagogy introduces its own moral and political tensions. The testifying
victim must not be seen primarily as dramatic material for effectively staging
the work of a truth commission or as a means to a truth commission's end of
reaching an audience, amassing evidence, and enhancing the credibility of its
authoritative account of repression or conflict. A truth commission needs to
consider its responsibility in inviting victims to testify. Victims seek relief of
various kinds in testifying to a truth commission: relief from a tormenting lack
of information about the fate ofloved ones; relief from suffering in silence and
living with disrespect and denial; relief in the form of material compensation
and legal and social services, as well as personal and political recognition. It is
increasingly recognized that truth commissions need to protect victims from
retraumatization, retaliation, and exploitation in coming forward to testify. It
is important to consider every way that a truth commission can be designed
to manage expectations responsibly and to meet victim expectations to the
greatest extent possible. That, too, is a pedagogy of the equal moral worth and
dignity of individuals within a human rights culture. 14

'3
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See Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith, Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of
Recognition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) on the power of storytelling and human
rights.
On tensions and misfits between what victims seek and what truth commissions do or can
offer, see Timothy Sizwe Phakati and Hugo van der Merwe, "The Impact of the TRC 's
Amnesty Process on Survivors of Human Rights Violation," in Truth and Reconciliation in
South Africa; Brandon Hamber, Transforming Societies after Political Violence; Lisa Laplante
and Kimberley Theidon, "Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth
Commission Peru," Human Rights Quarterly 29 (2007): 228-250; David Becker, "Confronting
the Truth of the Erinyes: The Illusion of Harmony in the Healing of Trauma," in Telling the
Truths; and Nora Strejilovich, "Testimony: Beyond the Language of Truth," Human Rights
Quarterly 28 (2oo6): 701-713.
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9.1.2.

Reconstructing the Epistemic Environment

Second, a human rights culture is a social environment that cultivates general
awareness of the reality, prevalence, causes, and conditions of grave human
rig~ts violations. A human rights culture pulls against all too common human
tendencies to disbelief and denial about gross abuses and extreme violence.
Instead, it encourages a historically informed understanding that many kinds
of societies fail to respect and protect the basic rights of every human being,
usually with the quiet acquiescence or more active complicity of large portions of the public, and that wholesale failures that degenerate into persecution and violence have always punctuated human history. A human rights
culture prepares people to understand that "it can happen here" and equips
them to recognize the signs of escalating danger and imminent abuses, to
interpret correctly evidence that serious abuses are in fact occurring, and to
question the denials and evasions of officials. This is necessary in part because
extreme forms of violence are often shrouded in secrecy or cloaked in euphemism, denied by public authorities, or supported and justified by selective
information, disinformation, and propaganda.
It is also necessary because human beings find it difficult to entertain and
to come to terms with the reality of extreme and shocking forms of violence.
Describing atrocities as "unspeakable," "unthinkable," or '\mimaginable" is
not always hyperbole. In Lawrence Langer's work on Holocaust testimony,
one survivor, Julia S. , says "You're not supposed to see this; it doesn't go with
life." 15 There is ample evidence that human beings can and will resist acknowledging disturbing or terrifying truths about violence and degradation; these
truths can challenge and overwhelm our senses of compassion and obligation.
At an even deeper level, we may simply be unprepared to believe that such
things are true if they contradict reassuring beliefs about human behavior and
society. Michael Ignatieff has famously said, "All that a truth commission can
achieve is to reduce the number of lies that circulate unchallenged." 16 But
this view underappreciates the deeply contextual and holistic nature of belief.
What it is reasonable for even sincere and alert persons to believe is happening, has happened, or can happen is a function of what they already believe
is possible or likely. 17 A truth commission must contribute to an epistemic ·

•s Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies : T he Ruins of Memory (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1991), 136.
•6 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modem C onscience (New York:
Henry Holt, 1997) , 173.
'7 Psychologists point to " just-world thinking" that reassures us that the world is just and that
people get what they deserve, thus warding off the possibility that victimization is random
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environment in which the likelihood and salience of certain kinds and patterns of events has decisively shifted.
A truth commission not only brings forth findings concerning specific
human rights abuses within its mandate, but in doing so it initiates a process
of epistemic restructuring that is essential to the reception and retention of
the kinds of truths, in particular, that a commission reveals or confirms. A
truth commission needs to do more than tell individual truths that challenge
individual lies. It needs to shift the senses of plausibility and probability of
its audience enough to make the truths it has told more credible to a broad
public than the lies it has challenged. A truth commission can and must tell
not only discrete truths about violations and responsibility, but enough of the
larger story to make it reasonable to believe what is in fact true and to search
for a more comprehensive picture that fits the facts revealed. Truth commission reports have implications for how abuses might have been prevented,
but truth commission findings can also shift the balance of probabilities concerning what reasonable people should believe about what human beings are
capable of doing and what they should expect under conditions that invite
abuses.
In narrower focus, a truth commission documents the reality of pervasive
and shocking offenses in a particular place and time period, at the same time
making them comprehensible as a function of conditions in that place at that
time. It sheds light on the conditions under which individuals felt safe or justified in committing these acts, the ways that authorities permitted them and
covered them up, and the degree to which society tolerated or ignored them,
especially when particular stigmatized or marginalized groups were targeted,
or when those targeted were presumptively maligned CThey must have done
something"). As the testimonies of victims are crucial to animating and rendering concrete the reasons that human rights abuses matter, the testimonies
of perpetrators, still rare in truth commissions, may be particularly effective
in demonstrating how human rights abuses happen, including how ordinary
people under certain conditions can perform disturbing or horrendous acts.
A truth commission can reveal how political, social, and institutional factors
interacted to allow this to happen. It confronts disbelief rooted in the simple
conviction that "it can't happen here" or "our soldiers wouldn't do that" or
"we live in a civilized society."!&A truth commission in response says to its

'8

and uncontrollable. See Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions, 9 and 150; and Ervin Staub,
The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Other Groups Help and Harm
Others (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 124.
See Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge:
Polity, 2001), 140-167.
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own society and to the world at large: it did happen here; our government
(or soldiers, police officers, or neighbors) did do this; the society we live in
is, at least in part, the one the truth commission has described. When a truth
commission holds up a mirror to its society, it begins to lift the burden of
proof from victims, to confirm but also situate the behavior of perpetrators,
and potentially to encourage a broader public to recognize their own forms of ·
complicity and responsibility.
In addition to reshaping perceptions of the past, there is also potential for
the future. On broader and narrower planes, truth commission findings can
lower the threshold of resistance to recognizing the imminence or presence
of abuses, especially if findings are disseminated and incorporated into public
dialogue, media coverage, school education, and professional training, both
within affected societies and more widely in human rights education. Being
prepared to believe in the reality or likelihood of human rights abuses when
the evidence is present, and knowing what the evidence looks like, is necessary
for preventive action. A truth commission can contribute to this preparation.

9.1.3. Inhibiting and Deterring Rights-Violating Behavior
Third, a culture of human rights informs individuals' prospective and shared
understanding of conduct that violates the human rights of others. In this way,
it carries potential to inhibit or deter abuses. The entrenchment of a vocabulary of criminal abuses might lead human rights norms to become internalized by individuals, incorporated into individuals' normative understanding
of moral, social, and legal boundaries, so as to create some prior restraint or
inhibition in participating in human rights abuses. Or, as the prospect of sanctions, formal and informal, is made more salient or is perceived to be more
probable, individuals' rational calculation about engaging in certain behavior
might be changed.
When South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was
charged with examining the perspectives of perpetrators as well as victims, the
TRC took account of the role played by perceptions of the political struggle
and self-perceptions both of those engaged in defense of the ruling power or
in violent resistance to it. The TRC report noted that uin a situation regarded
as war, violent actions were undertaken with pride rather than with distress
and embarrassment." 9 A culture of human rights undertakes to shift those
internalized attitudes and understandings, furnishing a counterweight to the
1
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Report of the Truth and Reconciliaton Commission of South Mrica, Vol. 5, 263, http://www.
doj.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm (accessed 20 August 2011).
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situational pressures and peer cultures that predictably allow individuals, especially those in positions of public authority or those under the orders of those
more powerful, to see their abusive conduct as right or even heroic, or to justify it in terms of professionalism or political necessity. Chilean activist Sola
Sierra says, "Remembering helps the people of a country avoid committing
the same crimes, calling things by their name; a criminal is a criminai."zo If
one is the criminal, however, one needs to see oneself under that description,
instead of seeing oneself as a good soldier, a policeman just doing the job, a
freedom fighter, or a patriot.
Skepticism about the effectiveness of prior awareness of moral and legal
boundaries is entirely reasonable. It would be unwise to think that a truth
commission could have significant effects directly on the moral predispositions
and the conduct of individuals simply by underscoring the moral boundaries
of acceptable action. The reality of situational pressures that can overwhelm
personal conviction or inclination is widely recognized in studies of organized
violence. 21 Yet it is not unreasonable to believe that consistent societal messages, reinforced by formal and informal sanctions, and reiterated through
social institutions, such as media, education, law, and professional training, can
shift perceptions and conduct over time. Many societies have shifted understandings concerning the acceptability or inevitability of racial discrimination
or domestic violence, for example, by educating individuals and transforming
their perceptions of acceptable conduct. As important, when societies create informal social sanctions and introduce changes in institutional and legal
requirements, they circulate and reinforce new expectations of accountability
for actions that were once tolerated or accepted. What had once gone without
saying is remarked; what was once taken as someone's right or duty is now
understood as subject to negative attention, social disapproval, or legal sanction. The discourse of human rights, embodied and implemented in varied
practices, carries that message, and a truth commission is a highly concerted
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pedagogy of that discourse. Truth commissions articulate and define core
human rights categories, especially in terms of "gross violations," and make
clear that while human rights violations can be explained to some extent by
social, political, and institutional conditions, they are the acts of individuals
who can and might be held accountable for what they have done, potentially
with very public consequences.
There is also the possibility of deterrence, by creating the understanding that anyone who participates in human rights abuses may be exposed at
least to nonlegal but public accountability, and possibly to moral reproach,
administrative penalties, or legal sanctions. Violators face the prospect of
being found morally or politically responsible for grave wrongs in the eyes of
others, even where liability to criminal prosecution is foreclosed or unlikely.
Lawrence Weschler says, "When the torturer assures his victim, 'No one will
ever know,' he is at once trying to break the victim's spirit and to bolster his
own. He needs to be certain that no one will ever know; otherwise the entire
premise of his own participation in the encounter would quickly come into
question."22 Deterrent effects are perhaps more likely to be cumulative, arising from the trend toward establishing truth commissions, rather than issuing
just from a particular truth commission. As officially organized truth-telling
becomes an international norm and a standard procedure in the aftermath of
a period of conflict or repression, individuals, especially those in positions of
authority, are faced with greater odds that their conduct might come under
eventual public scrutiny. What they do might be exposed to their families,
friends, and communities and might enter an enduring public and historical
record as a shameful or criminal activity. The more widely known and practiced organized truth recovery projects are, the more likely it becomes that
victims and human rights advocates will insist on a public truth process in the
wake of violence. In this way, the odds of protective secrecy and deniability
can be shifted in the minds of potential perpetrators. I hasten to add that deterrence claims for any kind of sanction, including criminal punishment, are
notoriously difficult to verify conclusively.2 3 Yet many seem to believe that the
establishment of norms and institutions, nationally and internationally, that
increase the likelihood of criminal prosecution of human rights crimes might
be a deterrent. The likelihood of being exposed in a truth recovery process,
however, is far greater, even if its consequences might be less dire.
22
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9.1.4- Preparation for Resistance
Fourth, a culture of human rights would seek to motivate individuals to act affirmatively in situations of impending or actual human rights emergencies or in
the face of persistent patterns of abuse. Awareness of the reality and seriousness
of violations is not enough. Victoria Barnett notes in her study of bystanders
during the Holocaust that knowledge that atrocities are occurring may prompt
disbelief, indifference, passivity, and a sense of powerlessness instead of protest or resistance. 2 4 This suggests that a culture of human rights must include
not only heightened awareness of offenses and threats but also clear models of
effective citizen protest, mobilization, and resistance and an understanding of
institutional mechanisms or platforms to challenge the actions of offending
authorities and to recruit the support of domestic or international actors. Truth
commissions tend to provide detailed documentation of horrific abuses. Truth .
commissions could, however, undertake to illustrate admirable and effective
forms of action, organization, and resistance that were or could have been
adopted, and possibilities of activating domestic institutions or seeking international assistance in preventing, publicizing, or stopping illegitimate activity.
Ron Dudai has recently argued that investigating, documenting, disseminating, commemorating, and celebrating narratives of rescue, and honoring rescuers, belongs to a "thickened" conception of transitional justice. 2 5
Investigation and preservation of accounts of rescue activity, Dudai proposes,
can serve both reconciliatory and denunciatory aims in a post-conflict setting.
On the reconciliatory side, rescuer narratives challenge group stereotypes,
individualizing guilt and pulling against fixed and binary group identities.
The acts of rescuers, deviant in the setting of system crimes that require widespread acceptance, motivated ignorance, or complicity, also pull beyond
victim-perpetrator dichotomies in the direction of a more nuanced picture of
individual choices. For that same reason, Dudai argues, commemoration of
rescuers has denunciatory impact, highlighting the difference between those,
such as rescuers, who took action to stop or mitigate atrocities, and those
who did not take an active role in atrocities but also did not take oppositional
action. In this way, rescue commemoration brings bystanders and beneficiaries, uncomfortably but instructively, into public view, showing "that silence
in the face of genocide and atrocities is not an inevitable position." 26
Victoria Barnett, Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1999), 51 and 123. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, also says that victim testimonies
"induce fear, confusion, shame, horror, skepticism, even disbelief," 94•s Ron Dudai, "'Rescuers for Humanity': Rescuers, Mass Atrocities, and Transitional Justice,"
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Dudai is promoting projects of recognizing "rescues for humanity" (in parallel to the category of crimes against humanity) as distinct measures among
others for post-conflict and transitional justice. His principal model is Yad
Vashem, the Israeli Holocaust Remembrance Authority, "the most extensive,
developed, and influential project of its kind ... a unique enterprise in the
global landscape of commemoration," with its careful verification of acts of
humanitarian rescue during the Holocaust, and its public honors conferred
on rescuers as the "righteous among nations." 2 7 While Dudai makes a persuasive case for such independent and ongoing measures in the aftermath of
repression or conflict, his argument bears also on one task that a truth commission might assume, within its limited time frame and narrower scope, as
an important part of its contribution to a pedagogy of human rights. Truth
. commissions need not be restricted specifically to investigating humanitarian rescue behavior, or only to individual acts of moral courage in providing
rescue or aid, although Dudai is right that these serve as moral instruction in
a striking and memorable way. Truth commissions can document attempts
to intervene, both by individuals and by important institutions, in ways that
made or might have made a difference in reducing or preventing gross abuses
of human rights. Such examples serve to illustrate not only that individual passivity is not inevitable, but that some kinds of political action and mobilization
by individuals, groups, and institutions (or by individuals and groups within
institutions) is possible and can make a difference.
Bronwyn Leebaw suggests that truth commissions, rather than narrowing the
scope of their investigations, might expand them to "encompass the themes of
complicity and resistance." 28 South Mrica's TRC's sectoral hearings ventured
into this territory by examining the failures of major institutions and professions
to oppose apartheid, but an emphasis on oppositional action might teach the
same lesson as well or better. 2 9 Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(whose final report is entitled Hatun Willakuy, a Quechua phrase that can be
translated into English as a "great story" of both tragedy and resistance) also
examined social and professional sectors and human rights organizations to
assess and recognize positive contributions as well as failures.
Dudai notes that magnifying widespread complicity and bystanding might
enhance broader support for reparations efforts and other collective forms of
acknowledgment, such as public apology. Truth commissions are standardly
2
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charged with recommending reparations but cannot implement the programs
they recommend. Mobilizing public sentiment in support of such programs,
· within a truth commission's narrow scope of operation, is a worthy function
to assume and is not really a completely new demand. It is, after all, one particular aspect of the truth commission's task of making society aware of the
realities and causes of conflict, and failures to act on conscience or to mobilize
politically for resistance are in many situations among those causes of the
occurrence and severity of human rights abuses.
9.2. DO TRUTH COMMISSIONS ACTUALLY PROMOTE HUMAN
RIGHTS CULTURE?

I have suggested that truth commissions have a rather direct relationship to
four features associated with a culture of human rights, so that truth commissions might make an immediate and specific, but partial and modest, contribution to promoting a human rights culture, and in so doing to contribute
incrementally to preventing future abuses. First, the discourse of truth commissions teaches, concretely applies, and vividly illustrates the meaning and
categorical import of the language of human rights , decisively reframing past
behavior in the process. Second, truth commissions work on transforming the
epistemic environment, locally and globally. The findings of truth commissions, individually and collectively, contribute to a heightened and historically informed awareness of the reality, extremity, and prevalence of serious
human rights abuses, countering human tendencies to disbelief and denial.
With respect to the particular era a truth commission is charged to investigate, a commission must seek to create a presumption in favor of the story it
documents so that the burden of proof is decisively shifted onto those who
continue to minimize or deny the specific abuses the truth commission has
investigated. Third, the proliferation of truth commissions globally and their
increasingly public processes attempt to create inhibiting and deterrent effects
for those who might engage in behavior that violates human rights standards.
The fourth function is a largely untapped potential of truth commissions: they
might offer instruction and inspiration on the means and importance of active
citizen protest, resistance, and pursuit of justice. If a truth commission does
this, it explicitly undertakes a preventive pedagogy. While attempts at direct
preparation for resistance to massive or systemic abuses is clearly a task for
ongoing human rights and peacebuilding education, through public information, formal education, and professional training, a truth commission has the
opportunity to put forward vivid and moving examples of concrete resistance
to evil and cruelty and to prompt thinking about the choices individuals do
and can make and the consequences that follow. .
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The first two functions have to do with the public articulation, amplification, and entrenchment of human rights language, norms, and awareness;
the latter two functions have to do with possible impacts on future individual
behavior. The first function, entrenching human rights language and teaching and animating human rights standards, is the most immediate and certain
contribution of truth commissions. Were this the only reliable contribution
they could make to human rights culture, it would not be a small one; teaching
what human rights are and what they mean for people's lives is foundational to
any environment we might call a culture of human rights. The second function, remodeling the epistemic environment and shifting burdens of proof
and credibility, is also a fairly direct contribution, but it clearly depends on
the strength, dissemination, circulation, and reception of a truth commission's
work and findings. Both of these functions clearly depend on a constellation
of factors that affect how a truth commission conducts and circulates its work;
these factors include its legitimacy, its design and terms of reference, its publicity, its resources, and the social authority, political endorsement, and dissemination of its findings. Inhibiting or deterring effects of truth commissions,
the third function, are hardly automatic. These effects would seem to depend
globally on the trend toward public accountability through truth commissions,
and locally to the consequences of exposure to or in a particular truth commission process. The fourth contribution is largely exemplary; the long-range
impact of demonstrating possibilities of effective actions against human rights
abuses is likely to be carried by human rights and peace-building education
that lies beyond a truth commission process. It seems that both of the latter
two functions- inhibiting or deterring human rights-violating behavior and
modeling and supporting human rights intervention- can only be realized by
effective practices of human rights protection, enforcement, and education
that go well beyond anything a truth commission itself can do. All of these
potential contributions of a truth commission require political will, public
and authoritative actions, popular attention, structural and financial support,
and broad civil and institutional engagement.
Transitional measures other than truth commissions, such as criminal
prosecution, vetting, reparations, and memorialization, might supply some
of what is needed to support and amplify the contributions a truth commission might make.3° The institutional reforms recommended by truth commissions include ones that address societal structures, including judicial, police,
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security, political, and electoral systems. These reforms also contribute directly
to a climate of transparency, accountability, due process, fair procedures, and
the rule of law that are hallmarks of a human rights culture. Yet truth commissions have emerged, evolved, and proliferated because they have found a
unique niche in the transitional context. They address multiple parties in transitional societies, giving voice to victims, visiting some kinds of accountability
on individuals and institutions that committed abuses, and holding a mirror to
society at large, forcing questions of motivated ignorance, complicity, and collective responsibility at various levels. They outline agendas for institutional
reform in a particularly salient way, by providing concrete evidence of why
those reforms are urgently needed in light of abuses that have actually happened. That truth commissions cannot achieve their full or best impact unilaterally is not to say that they do not have an impact. That their efficacy depends
on other measures, and on political action and institutional support, is not to
say that their impact is not a direct and important one, given favorable conditions for a commission's operation and the dissemination of its findings.
Recent empirical work is nonetheless cautious and divided about the kinds
of impact truth commissions can have. Eric Brahm's study of the impact of
truth commissions on human rights reform and prevention is equivocal. He
finds in several case studies that truth commissions have prompted human
rights reforms, but in large scale statistical overview, he finds that human
rights situations overall have declined following truth commissions. Brahm
concludes: "While the foundations for human rights improvement, however
limited, may be laid by truth commissions, it is often a long time, if ever, before
prospective gains are realized in practice."3' In a wider-ranging study involving ninety-one transitions to democracy from authoritarian rule in seventy-four
countries, researchers Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter find that
use of truth commissions in the absence of other transitional measures shows a
uniquely negative relationship with measures of human rights protection and
democracy post-transition, while trials and amnesties used alone show no effect
on these measuresY While these investigators acknowledge that a finer-grained
study of variations among truth commissions may be necessary to explain or
refine their negative findings about the efficacy of truth commissions, they
support a holistic conception of transitional justice that requires an integrated
process involving multiple measures. Based on their findings, they advocate the
use of transitional justice measures in cmnbination, and in particular for the
combination of trials, truth commissions, and amnesties, for which they find
j'
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a positive impact on both democracy and human rights. Kathryn Sikkink, on
the other hand, argues that "not only punishment matters but that truth telling
matters as well."33 Her data, collected using somewhat different measures from
those of the previous study, show that truth commissions as well as criminal
trials are associated with a decrease in repression. Sikkink's explanation is that
this effect of truth commissions is due to information and the communication
of norms, as my own account suggests. She argues for the impact of"deterrence
and socialization" in both criminal trials and truth commissions through the
diffusion of new norms by individuals and organizations.34
Empirical study of transitional justice outcomes is fairly recent, and findings
are still in progress and under debate. It is evident ~hat the idea of "promoting
a human rights culture" is complex. It encompasses articulating, publicizing,
familiarizing, and entrenching human rights norms, but also institutionalizing practices that effectively protect individuals' human rights and enforce
human rights standards. There are likely complex disjunctures and forms of
positive and negative feedback among these processes (and many other external factors) that complicate their impact on individual thought and behavior.
There is little doubt that human rights talk has become a globally shared
idiom; but whether practices organized by human rights discourse are protecting human beings on the ground, and if so how well they are doing so, is contested and likely to remain so for a while. In her 2011 book, Sikkink says that
she and Leigh Payne are working to merge their databases and to converge
on measures to better explore "how transitional justice leads to human rights
improvements, and especially, through what processes or mechanisms" trials
and truth commissions might increase observance of human rights.35 Emilie
Hafner-Burton and James Ron, in an overview and analysis of qualitative and
quantitative research into whether international human rights policies and
instruments actually have a positive impact, also find mixed results. They
trace a deep divide between "case study optimism," especially with respect
to human rights developments in Latin America and Eastern Europe, compared with "statistical skepticism" of large-scale cumulative studies from the
late 1990s about human rights efficacy in protecting personal integrity rights
worldwide.3 6 Hafner-Burton and Ron reveal complications in settling this
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debate, ranging from problems in the collection of data and the reliability of
sources, to slippage between measures of democracy and measures of human
rights observance, and between assessment of structures and measures of individual behavior.
Two further questions loom. One is the question of the relevant time frame
for measuring the shift(s) in question. There was a half-century hiatus between
the birth of international criminal justice at Nuremberg and the establishment of a statute for the International Criminal Court. The first influential
truth recovery projects occurred in Latin America in the 198os and 199os;
it is unclear what time frame reasonably applies to assessing the impact of
individual truth commissions and to the truth commission trend as a whole.
It was arguably not until South Mrica's innovative TRC in the late 1990s captured a global audience that some distinctive features and potentials of a truth
commission became widely appreciated, and some features, such as public
testimonies by victims, became models for other truth commission operations.
Truth commissions as institutions with a distinctive medley of functions are
but a few decades old, and their organization and practice is still evolving.37
In addition, the outcome measures commonly used in social scientific studies
are not ones created in anticipation of the uses to which they are now put;
dedicated measures will take time to construct and to put to use. This is a
practical question.
A second question is a moral one. To the extent that transitional institutions are increasingly understood and experienced as an expression of justice,
then it seems that states are obligated to victims and to their societies to provide at least that much justice in the inevitably imperfect and challenging
post-conflict context. In the case of truth commissions, the justice in question involves the victim's right to the truth, the state's obligation to seek it,
and the reaffirmation of the victim's dignity through establishing the truth
and through respectful recognition of her or his choice to speak it.3 8 If that
37
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is justice, it ought to be done and be seen to be done, just as those guilty of
grave harms should stand accountable for those harms (whether it is before
a criminal court or in some other fashion), lest the injustice of impunity for
gross abuses stand. This does not mean that the fulfilment of demands of justice is a moral absolute, or that no countervailing obligations or values might
have to be weighed in balance with these justice demands. But it does mean
that if one can defend the obligations of transitional or post-conflict societies
as requirements of justice, these demands have a claim to be honored that is
not simply grounded on whether other aims or outcomes, including freedom,
security, stability, democracy, or peace are served in the short, or even in the
longer, term. 39
A culture of human rights is a culture of respect for human beings as such ,
and for universal norms of behavior that are held to embody and express the
most fundamental forms of respect for human beings. Even were it true that
other legal, political, and economic practices, distinct from practices focused
on human rights, really secure (or are necessary to secure) the personal integrity rights of individuals, it would still be important to enact the dignity and
respect that human rights language and practices embody. It is likely that
human rights discourse and its allied practices have achieved as much global
currency as they unquestionably have in part (although only in part) because
they capture a moral vision and provide a language for moral claims that
human beings in many and disparate situations need for their protests against
mistreatment, oppression, and violence. Truth commissions in particular are
among the devices that signal the adoption of positive political values. A zoo6
United Nations Study on the Right to the Truth concludes that this right is
"closely linked to the rule of law and the principles of transparency, accountability and good governance in a democratic society."4o In other words, a truth
commission publicly expresses and enacts not only certain forms of justice but
impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Addendum, Updated Set of principles for the protection and
promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity," E/CN.4-f2oo5/102/Add. 1,
Febmary 8, 2005; and United Nations General Assembly, "Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations oflnternational Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations oflnternational Humanitarian Law," A/RES/6o/47, March
21, 2006. See also Juan E. Mendez, "Accountability for Past Abuses," Human Rights Quarterly
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other values of political communities that respect the dignity, autonomy, and
security of their citizens.41

9-3- CONCLUSION

It should in the end not be surprising that building and sustaining a culture
of human rights requires that the language, standards, and consequences of
human rights norms be established visibly and redundantly throughout societies, in their political discourse, legal systems, public institutions, media, and
education. Establishing a human rights culture also requires the implementation and enforcement of human rights standards, locally and internationally.
I have suggested that what a truth commission does, and how it does it, can
make a real and visible, even if partial, cumulative, and modest contribution
to the project of preventing human rights crimes, domestically and internationally, even as it serves other important ends.
It is important to stress in conclusion that claims for preventive power are
not the only repeated claims about what truth commissions can do, and that
prevention is not the only achievement or impact of truth commissions that
matters. Establishing a credible and authoritative record of events, no small
accomplishment, is the core mission of a truth commission, whatever else it
does or does not do. Truth commissions are also universally claimed to restore
or reaffirm the dignity of victims through public recognition, voice, and moral
validation. Truth commissions are often said to achieve such valuable results
as creating forms of accountability, blocking future denial of human rights
crimes, combating impunity, providing a new national narrative or a shared
collective memory for a society refashioning itself, or contributing to political
reconciliation. In a full assessment of the value of truth commissions, many
aims, and not just preventive aims, need to be considered. Yet if truth commissions are especially suited to conducting a case-based and cumulative pedagogy of human rights, they belong among the instruments of both transitional
justice and jus post bellum that aim at the restoration or creation of a just and
rights-respecting peace in the aftermath of repression or conflict.
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